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Robots are increasingly capable of performing everyday human activities such as cooking,
cleaning, and doing the laundry. This requires the real-time planning and execution of
complex, temporally extended sequential actions under high degrees of uncertainty, which
provides many challenges to traditional approaches to robot action control. We argue that
important lessons in this respect can be learned from research on human action control.
We provide a brief overview of available psychological insights into this issue and focus on
four principles that we think could be particularly beneﬁcial for robot control: the integration
of symbolic and subsymbolic planning of action sequences, the integration of feedforward
and feedback control, the clustering of complex actions into subcomponents, and the
contextualization of action-control structures through goal representations.
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INTRODUCTION
In a relatively short time span, the discipline of robotics has
advanced from producing industrial non-autonomous, repetitive
machines to semi-autonomous agents that should be able to func-
tion in a dynamic, human-driven world. Simple examples include
automatic vacuum cleaners such as Roombas, but more ﬂexible
and autonomous humanoid robots are currently under devel-
opment (e.g., the RoboHow.Cog project: www.robohow.eu). As
robots perform more and more everyday human activities such as
household chores, interacting with humans, and thereby almost
becoming citizens in our societies, we believe that psychologists
can provide relevant knowledge about human behavior that is
generalizable to robots.
Like early approaches to artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), traditional
cognitive psychology considers behavior (of biological or artiﬁ-
cial agents) to emerge from discrete series of cognitive operations
that take information from the environment (registered by sen-
sory organs or artiﬁcial sensors), process this information in more
or less complex ways, and eventually manipulate something in
the environment as a result of this processing. In psychology,
this discrete, serial processing model of cognition has been suc-
cessful in explaining various psychological phenomena, but for
one reason or another most research has focused on the early and
middle stages of this process, leaving action and motor control far
behind. Indeed, psychology as an autonomous science has histori-
cally shown an impressive neglect of the study of action and motor
control, to the extent that it has even been called the “Cinderella
of psychology” (Rosenbaum, 2005).
Fortunately, however, more recent approaches have empha-
sized the role of action not only as an output function but as
a precondition and basic ingredient of human cognition (e.g.,
Clark, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001; O’Regan and Noe, 2001). These
recent approaches have criticized the traditional sequential-stage
account of human behavior for analyzing action as a consequence
of stimuli. They argue that action is more aptly characterized
as people’s means to produce stimuli (desired outcomes), rather
than as a means to respond to stimuli (Hommel, 2009). More-
over, actions are more than mere ballistic outputs: they are events
that unfold in time and that must be structured in such a way
that their outcome satisﬁes current needs and goals. Consider, for
example, the act of tea-making, which consists of a number of
components: (1) boiling water, (2) putting a tea bag in a teapot,
(3) pouring the boiling water in the teapot, and (4) pouring the
tea in one or more cups. Executing these different components in
such a way that the intended goal is eventually achieved requires
planning. In the following, we will provide a brief overview of
available psychological insights into how this planning works in
humans, and how these insights might inform the creation of
robotic everyday action systems. At the moment, although robot
actions mimic human action, the control systems are in fact
quite different. We will conﬁne our discussion to four principles
that we think could be particularly beneﬁcial for robot control:
the integration of symbolic and subsymbolic planning of action
sequences, the integration of feedforward and feedback con-
trol, the clustering of complex actions into subcomponents, and
the contextualization of action-control structures through goal
representations.
INTEGRATING SYMBOLIC AND SUBSYMBOLIC PLANNING
In contrast to the ballistic, single-step actions that participants
in laboratory experiments often carry out, everyday action com-
monly consists of multiple components, as in the tea-making
example. In AI and robotics, multi-component actions are com-
monly planned at a symbolic level, with each action component
being represented by an arbitrary symbol or function. The STRIPS
(Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver) planner (Fikes and
Nilsson, 1971) is a famous example: it serves to translate an ini-
tial state into an intended goal state by determining the subset of
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actions (deﬁned as a symbolically described relation between sets
of pre- and post-conditions) needed to do so. The format of all
representations involved is symbolic allowing all goals and actions
to be represented in basically the same way, although they can be
arbitrarily linked to subsymbolic trigger states. This uniformity
allows for a very efﬁcient planning process, as action components
can be easily manipulated and exchanged until the entire plan is
optimal.
Symbolic action planning of this sort is consistent with early
models of human action planning, which typically connected
underspeciﬁed symbolic action representations with subsymbolic
trigger states that took care of timing. For instance, Margaret
Washburn considered that later action components might be trig-
gered by the perception of the execution of the previous one:
“If the necessary stimulus for pronouncing the last syllable of
a series were the muscular contractions produced in pronounc-
ing the next to the last syllable, then the proper sequence of
movements would be insured” (Washburn, 1916, p. 9). Along
the same lines, James (1890) suggested a serial chaining model,
according to which each action component is triggered by the
perception of the sensory feedback produced by the previous com-
ponent. Accordingly, learners will create associations linking the
motor patterns and their sensory consequences in a chain-like
fashion.
As more studies were conducted, however, it was found that
chaining accounts of sequential behavior cannot account for
several empirical observations. In a seminal paper, the neurophys-
iologist Lashley (1951) pointed out that the serial chaining models
of the time were not adequate, because: (1) movements can still be
executed if sensory feedback is impaired; (2) some movements are
executed too quickly to have time to process feedback from pre-
ceding actions, and (3) errors in behavior suggest the presence of
predetermined action plans (Rosenbaum et al., 2007). Rosenbaum
et al. (2007) added further arguments against a chaining account
of sequential action. For example, the time needed to initiate an
action is a function of its complexity (Henry and Rogers, 1960;
Klapp, 1977; Rosenbaum, 1987), suggesting that the agent antic-
ipates later action components before beginning to execute the
ﬁrst.
Along the same lines, Cohen and Rosenbaum (2004); [for
another good example see Van der Wel and Rosenbaum (2007)]
had participants grasp a vertical cylinder placed on a platform
and move it to another platform that was either higher or lower
than the initial location. The researchers determined the verti-
cal location of the grasp, and found that the grasp location was
dependent on the expected end state. More speciﬁcally, subjects
tended to choose a lower grasp location when bringing the cylin-
der to a higher position, and vice versa. Likewise, when subjects
were asked to move the cylinder back to its starting position,
they tended to grasp it in the location where they grasped it
before. This end-state comfort effect suggests that people antici-
pate the position that they will assume after the action has been
completed.
The same conclusion is suggested by studies on context effects
in speech production. For example, people round their lips before
pronouncing the t in the word tulip, in anticipation of pronounc-
ing the u later in the sequence (Daniloff and Moll, 1968; Bell-Berti
and Harris, 1979; Fowler, 1980; Rosenbaum, 1991). This does not
seem to be a purely epiphenomenal property of human action; one
can easily see how this produces more efﬁcient, smoother speech,
and a more careful use of the human speech-production “hard-
ware.” An analogous action blending effect occurs when people
reach for objects: people adaptively ﬂex their ﬁngers while moving
the hand toward an object (Jeannerod et al., 1995), and has been
observed to develop when sequentially moving a cursor through
a learned series of stimuli (Kachergis et al., under review). Com-
pared to typical step-wise robotic motion, this action blending
seems to be more efﬁcient, using predictive motion to minimize
the time and energy required to achieve the goal.
Further insights into human sequential action planning come
from Gentner et al. (1980), who conducted a photographic study
of a skilled typist. Using high-speed photography, they analyzed
the hand movements of a 90-wpm typist, and found that the typ-
ist’s hands were moving continuously, with ﬁngers starting to
move toward a destination before several preceding characters
were to be typed. In fact, for 96% of all keystrokes, movement
was initiated on average 137 ms before the preceding keystroke
was completed, and for 21% the movement was initiated before
the preceding keystroke was initiated. Larochelle (1984) presents
a similar but more extensive study, analyzing the typing of four
professional typists while they typed either words or non-words,
of which half were typed with one hand, and the other half with
two hands. In more than half of the trials the movement was initi-
ated before completion of the previous keystroke for two-handed
trials.
These interactions between early and later sequence elements
cast doubt on a simple chaining theory of sequential action.
Rosenbaum et al. (2007) interpreted these ﬁndings as evidence
that sensory feedback is not a necessary component for action
sequencing, in keeping with the conclusion of Lashley (1951).
They argued that “the state of the nervous system can predispose
the actor to behave in particular ways in the future,” (p. 526),
or, there are action plans for some behaviors. And yet, studies on
spontaneous speech repair (e.g., Nakatani and Hirschberg, 1994)
also show that people are very fast in ﬁxing errors in early compo-
nents of a word or sentence, much too fast to assume that action
outcomes are evaluated only after entire sequences are completed.
This means that action planning cannot be exclusively feedfor-
ward, as Lashley (1951) seemed to suggest, but must include
several layers of processing, with lower levels continuously check-
ing whether the current action component proceeds as expected.
In other words, action planning must be a temporally extended
process in which abstract representations to some extent provide
abstract goal descriptions, which must be integrated with lower-
level subsymbolic representations controlling sensorimotor loops.
The existence of subsymbolic sensorimotor representations would
account for context and anticipation effects, as described above. In
the more general ﬁeld of knowledge representation, some authors
even take it one step further, positing that subsymbolic, senso-
rimotor representations are necessary for higher-level symbolic
cognition. For example, Barsalou’s (1993,1999) perceptual symbol
systems theory deﬁnes cognition as embedded in theworld, stating
that agents form grounded models via perception and interaction
with their environments. With these models, the representation of
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abstract concepts can be implemented using grounded perceptual
symbols. The empirical support for theories like these motivate
the notion that both symbolic and subsymbolic representations
can (and should) work together to account for human cognition.
A good example for an action planning model that includes
one symbolic and one subsymbolic level is the typewriting model
suggested by Rumelhart and Norman (1982). To control typ-
ing the word “WORD,” say, the model would assume that the
symbolic/“semantic” representation WORD would activate motor
units controlling the ﬁnger movements required to type “W,”“O,”
“R,”and“D”in parallel. This parallel activation allows for crosstalk
between the different units, which would account for context
effects and anticipations. At the same time, the activated units
are prevented from ﬁring prematurely by means of a forward-
inhibition structure. That is, each unit is inhibiting all following
units in the sequence (so that the“W”unit inhibits the“O,”“R,”and
“D” units, the “O” unit the “R” and “D” units, and the “R” the “D”
unit) and release that inhibition only once they are executed. The
dynamics of these inhibition and release processes automatically
produce the necessary sequence. It is thought that such activa-
tion and inhibition processes play a role even in young infants
(Verschoor et al., unpublished). Immediate feedback, though not
explicitly addressed by Rumelhart and Norman (1982), could
serve to repair the actions controlled by particular units, but
the feedback would not be needed to produce the sequence – a
major advantage over chaining models. For an overview of similar
models and other action domains, see Logan and Crump (2011).
The main lesson for robotic everyday action control is
that purely symbolic planning may be too crude and context-
insensitive to allow for smooth and efﬁcient multi-component
actions. Introducing multiple levels of action planning and action
control may complicate the engineering considerably, but it is also
likely to make robot action more ﬂexible and robust – and less
“robotic” to the eye of the user.
INTEGRATING FEEDFORWARD AND FEEDBACK
MECHANISMS
In perfectly predictable environments such as industrial construc-
tion halls, there is hardly any need for feedback mechanisms.
Indeed, early industrial robots, such as Unimate, could rely on
fully preprogrammed feedforward control for repetitive multi-
component actions such as picking up and manipulating objects
(Hägele et al., 2008). However, real-life environments are much
too unpredictable to allow for purely feedforward control. Con-
sidering that purely feedback-based control is often much too slow
to allow for real-life human action, it is unsurprising that human
action control seeks for an optimal integration of feedforward and
feedback mechanisms.
One of the earliest studies into feedforward planning is Henry
and Rogers (1960), which compared reaction times of partici-
pants performing a simple ﬁnger movement to reaction times of
a moderately complex arm movement (reaching and grasping) in
response to a stimulus. The authors found that participants per-
forming the more complex movement showed a 20% increase in
reaction time, with as much as a 25% increase for even more com-
plex movement. This suggests the existence of feedforward action
planning prior to action execution.
Linguistic studies have shown a similar effect. Eriksen et al.
(1970) had participants read aloud two-digit numbers consisting
of a varying number of syllables. Longer numbers were shown to
have a longer onset delay. In order to account for the possibility
that factors other than motor planning play a role, participants
were given the same task with a delay between stimulus onset
and vocalization. Here, the effect disappeared, again providing
evidence for pre-execution action plan formation.
However, while it may be tempting to conclude that an
action plan is formed completely before action onset, incremen-
tal approaches to sequential action posit that this is not the
case. Palmer and Pfordresher (2003) argued that it is unlikely
for actors to have access to all elements in a long sequence,
as this would place unnecessarily large demands on memory –
just think of a conductor starting to conduct a 4-h Wagner
opera. Instead, planning and execution co-occur in time, limit-
ing access to sequence elements that appeared much earlier or
that lie far in the future. Evidence for this was indeed found by
Sternberg et al. (1988), in which six participants prepared and
produced sequences of mono- or tri-syllabic words. In addition to
the length effect discussed above, preparation times were found
to increase with length of the word sequence until approach-
ing asymptote (which was 10.3 ± 0.6 words for sequences of
mono-syllabic words and 6.4 ± 0.9 words for tri-syllabic words).
This suggests that plan formation and execution occur simulta-
neously, at least for longer sequences of actions, with a limited
capacity.
However, feedforward mechanisms alone cannot account for
such complex action as our tea-making example. A complete feed-
forward program would need to incorporate numerous unknown
parameters, such as the exact location and physical properties
(e.g., weight) of all necessary objects. The prior unavailability
of such parameters is not the only reason feedback mechanisms
might be helpful. Some parameters might be possible to include
in a feedforward program, but would simply be more efﬁcient
or optimal if ﬁlled in online, such as grip strength. Even if all
this information were available, an actor still needs to be able to
correct possible – sometimes inevitable – perturbations in action
execution.
Indeed, it seems that the presence of uncertainty (i.e., unavail-
ability of necessary parameters) increases the importance of
feedback mechanisms. Saunders and Vijayakumar (2011) ﬁtted
participants with a prosthetic hand that could provide vibro-
tactile feedback. Using this prosthetic hand, they were asked
to manipulate objects of different weights. Manipulating both
feedforward uncertainty by adding an unpredictable delay in the
prosthetic hand and feedback information by manipulating vibro-
tactile feedback, they found that performance decreased when
feedback was removed in situations with feedforward uncertainty.
This illustrates that human action emerges from the interaction of
feedforward and feedback mechanisms.
Integrating feedforward and feedback mechanisms holds the
promise to get the best from two worlds. Feedforward mecha-
nisms are likely to determine the necessary action components
and pre-load at least some of them before initiating the action
(Henry and Rogers, 1960), and to selectively tune attention to
stimuli and stimulus dimensions that are relevant for the task
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(Hommel, 2010). Feedback processes, in turn, provide excellent
accuracy – often at the cost of speed (Seidler et al., 2004). These
strengths and weaknesses have motivated hybrid models claim-
ing that feedforward mechanisms provide the skeleton of action
plans which leave open slots for parameters provided by feed-
back processes (Schmidt, 1975; Glover, 2004; Hommel, 2010).
A particularly good example of this kind of interaction is pro-
vided by the observations of Goodale et al. (1986). In a clever
experiment, participants were asked to rest their hand on a plat-
form and point to a visual target presented at a random location
on an imaginary line in their right visual ﬁeld. The partici-
pants were not told that in half of the trials the target changed
location during the ﬁrst saccade. The authors found that par-
ticipants would successfully point to the target on these trials
without even being aware of the location change, and without
additional delay. As feedforward programming is thought to take
time, a fast and online feedback mechanism of which partici-
pants are unaware has to be responsible for this ﬁnding. After
this study showing online adaptation of hand velocity, Prablanc
and Martin (1992) found that these results generalize to two
dimensions. Using stimuli presented on a screen, it was found
that both the velocity and trajectory of the hand were adjusted
online. This demonstrates that action is the result of a pre-
programmed action plan (the initial movement of the hand)
combined with online adaptation to reach goal requirements.
Interestingly, such a division of labor ﬁts well with the architec-
ture of the human brain, which includes both a slow, cognitively
penetrated ventral route from perception to action and a fast dor-
sal sensorimotor loop (for a broader overview, see Milner and
Goodale, 1995).
It is clear that both feedforward and feedback mechanisms
are responsible for producing complex action, but there remain
a number of unanswered questions. Are feedforward processes
always responsible for certain actions? Howare these plans learned,
and how do people know when to apply them? How does feedback
on a lower level result in action re-planning on a higher level, and
does this require conscious intervention? What is the division of
labor between feedback and feedforward mechanisms? How ﬂuid
is it – how hierarchical?
We know that with practice, the roles of feedback and feedfor-
ward processes change. In a standard rapid aimed limb movement
paradigm, participants are asked to perform a manual action in
order to reach a target. During such tasks, the response can be
regarded as having two elements: (1) a ballistic primarymovement,
thought to be controlled by a feedforward mechanism, and (2) a
secondary, corrective movement, thought to be caused by a feed-
back mechanism. Pratt and Abrams (1996) used such a paradigm
to investigate the effect of practice on the weight of primary and
secondarymovements. Participants were asked to repeatedlymove
a visual cursor to a target location using wrist rotation. With
more practice, the percentage of time spent in the ﬁrst movement
increased, while time spent in the second movement decreased.
As the ﬁrst movement is feedforward-controlled, this suggests that
practice reduces the need of feedback control, as the feedforward
process becomes more accurate. But will this learning general-
ize to new situations with similar action requirements, and is it
long-lasting?
To investigate the relationship between practice and feedback
control, Proteau et al. (1987) had participants practice an aim-
ing task on either 200 or 2000 trials and found that, when visual
feedback was taken away, participants who had more practice
were more impaired by the removal of feedback. This is not
what one would expect if practice simply shifts control to feed-
forward processes. Subsequent research has shown that, with
practice, higher peak velocities are reached in the early phase of
movement, thereby leaving more time for corrective submove-
ments based on feedback. Thus, instead of a shift from feedback
control to feedforward control, feedback processes seem to be opti-
mized as a result of practice (Proteau et al., 1987; Khan et al., 1998;
Elliott et al., 2010).
While the ﬁrst generation of robots and other intelligent sys-
tems had a strong preference for feedforward control, not in the
least because of the rather predictable environments they were
implemented in, some modern systems rely heavily on feedback
control to perform actions – especially humanoid systems oper-
ating in real-world scenarios. This is likely to work as long as
action production in such robots is slower than the feedback
loops informing them (Plooij et al., 2013), but progress in action
mechanics is likely to make hybrid feedforward/feedback systems
an attractive alternative in the near future.
HIERARCHICAL ACTION REPRESENTATION
Human actions can often be described in a hierarchical fashion:
“Going on vacation”implies action such as“packingmybags,”“get-
ting the car,” “loading it,” “driving down to city X,” and so forth
and so on. Many authors have taken that to imply that action
control is hierarchical as well. According to Lashley (1951), only
a hierarchical organization of actions and action plans can pro-
vide the opportunity to have the same motor acts acquire different
meanings, depending on the context in which the motor act is
performed. In Miller et al. (1960) seminal book, action plans are
even hierarchical by deﬁnition: “A Plan is any hierarchical process
in the organism that can control the order in which a sequence
of operations is to be performed” (p. 16). And yet, while it is
certainly uncontroversial that it is possible to describe actions as
hierarchical, this need not have any implication for the cognitive
organizationof actions. AsBadre (2008) argues,“the fact that a task
can be represented hierarchically does not require that the action
system itself consist of structurally distinct processing levels”
(p. 193; see also Klein, 1983). Moreover, it is not always clear what
authorsmean if they say that actions are organized in a hierarchical
fashion.
Uithol et al. (2012) noted that there are at least two ways to look
at hierarchical action. These twoways differ inwhat are considered
to be the different levels in such a hierarchy. One way to look
at action hierarchies is the view of part-whole relations. In this
account, each level in the hierarchy exists solely as the sum of
lower-level units. In other words, an action unit such as “get a pan
for pancake making”consists of the subunits “open the cupboard,”
“take pan from cupboard,” “place pan on counter,” and “close the
cupboard.” It should be clear that when all subordinate units are
present, the superordinate unit “get a pan” is also present, as it
is identical to the sum of its parts. Uithol et al. (2012) argues
that this kind of hierarchy does not provide an explanation of
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the complex action; it merely provides a thorough description
of the to-be-explained action, in which higher levels are more
complex than lower levels. It also does not give information about
the causal relationship between the different levels in the hierarchy,
as you cannot consider an element to be the cause of its own parts.
Another restriction of this type of hierarchy is that it can only
accommodate levels that are of a similar nature. That is, actions
can only be divided into sub-actions, not into objects or world
states.
Another way to view hierarchies is to see the different levels as
representing causal relations between the levels. In this approach,
units on a higher level causally inﬂuence units on a lower level.
In this type of hierarchy, lower-level units can be modulated by
higher-level units. In contrast with the part-whole hierarchy, lower
levels are not necessarily less complex than higher levels. Goals that
are formulated as simple and propositional states can be the cause
of more complex elements. Using this hierarchical approach also
opens up the possibility of states or objects being the cause of an
action, as it does not have the limitation of requiring action-type
goals.
Uithol et al. (2012) proposed a new model, in which the
fundamental foundation for thehierarchical structure is not cause-
and-effect (i.e., goals cause motor acts), or complexity (i.e.,
complex motor acts such as grabbing a pan consist of simpler
acts such as ﬂexing ﬁngers and grasping the handle), but tempo-
ral stability. In this view, stable representations can be considered
goal-related, while more temporary representations reﬂect motor
acts on different levels, not unlike the more enduring conceptual
representations and the less enduring motor units of Rumelhart
and Norman’s (1982) model discussed above. However, this repre-
sentation proposal does not include amodel of how the hierarchies
within a task are abstracted and learned from experience, nor of
how they may be shared across tasks despite requiring different
parameterizations.
Botvinick and Plaut (2004) tackled some of these issues, point-
ing out that not only is it unclear how existing hierarchical models
learn hierarchies from experience, but also that most theoretical
accounts lead to a circular reference: acquiring sequence knowl-
edge relies on the ability to identify event boundaries, which in
turn requires sequence knowledge. A further problem is sequenc-
ing in hierarchical structures; many models (e.g., Rumelhart and
Norman, 1982; Houghton, 1990) solve that by means of forward
inhibition, but this only works on units at the lowest level of a
hierarchy. Botvinick and Plaut (2004) offered a recurrent connec-
tionist network model that helps avoiding these problems. Using
computer simulations they showed that such a network, which
contains no inherent hierarchical structure, can learn a range of
sequential actions that many consider hierarchical. The hierarchy,
they argued, emerges from the system as a whole. The network
they used is a three-layer recurrent network, with an input layer
representing held objects and ﬁxated objects, an output layer rep-
resenting actions to be taken, and a hidden layer (with recurrent
connections) for the internal representation. Having trained this
network on a routine complex task (making coffee or tea), they
showed that it can perform complex action that can be consid-
ered hierarchical in nature (e.g., varying orders of subactions
leading to the same outcome) without relying on a hierarchical
system architecture. The network also showed slips of action
when the internal representation layer was degraded, as well as
other action errors found in empirical studies, although Cooper
and Shallice (2006) suggest that the relative frequency and types
of errors shown by the recurrent model do not match human
subjects.
We believe that architectures offering such hierarchical behav-
ior, without necessarily being hierarchically structured, can pro-
vide robots with the needed ﬂexibility to function in a dynamic,
human-driven world. Botvinick and Plaut’s (2004) model seems
to be able to account for some aspects of ﬂexible behavior, but
more complex and biologically inspired models such as LEABRA
(O’Reilly, 1996; Kachergis et al., under review) promise to gener-
alize to other tasks, as well as being able to learn relatively fast,
two aspects of human behavior we consider essential to emulate
in robot behavior.
CONTEXTUALIZING ACTION CONTROL
As pointed out above, one of the reasons why Lashley (1951)
considered action representations to be necessarily hierarchically
organized was the fact that the meaning and purpose of action
components vary with the goal that they serve to accomplish:
while making a kicking movement with your right leg can eas-
ily be replaced by moving your head sideways when trying to score
a goal in a soccer game, that would not be a particularly good
idea when performing a group can-can on stage during a per-
formance of Orpheus in the Underworld. In other words, goals
are needed to contextualize action components. In AI, robotics,
and some information-processing approaches in psychology, the
main function of goal representation is to guide the selection of
task components, including stimulus and response representations
or perception-action rules. In traditional processing models, like
ACT-R or Soar (Laird et al., 1987; Anderson, 1993), goal represen-
tations limit the number of production rules considered for a task,
which reduces the search space and makes task preparation more
efﬁcient (Cooper and Shallice, 2006). Moreover, goals commonly
serve as a reference in evaluating an action, when comparing the
current state of the environment with the desired state (Miller
et al., 1960).
This practice was challenged by Botvinick and Plaut (2004),
who pointed out at least two problems with goal representations
in cognitive models. First, goals themselves may be context-
dependent. The goal of cleaning the house may have rather
different implications depending on whether it serves to satisfy
the expectations of one’s partner or to prepare for a visit of one’s
mother-in-law. Likewise, the goal of stirring will produce some-
what different behavior depending on whether one is stirring egg
yolks or cement. Most models that postulate the existence of goals
do not allow for such context dependence. Second, it is argued that
many everyday activities do not seem to have deﬁnable, or at least
not invariant goals; just think of playing a musical instrument
or taking a walk. The authors demonstrated that goal-directed
behavior can be achieved without the explicit representation of
goals. In the previously mentioned simulation studies with recur-
rent neural networks, they were able to simulate goal-directed
actions that operate very much like Miller et al.’s (1960) TOTE
units, without any need to represent the goal explicitly. Obviating
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the need for representing goals, such a model could be applied
to behavior with non-obvious goals, such as taking a walk as a
consequence of feeling restless or having the thought of fresh air
(Botvinick and Plaut, 2004).
Cooper and Shallice (2006) took issue with this non-
representationalist account of goals, giving at least two reasons
why goals should be implemented in cognitive models. First, goals
allow for the distinction between critical and supporting actions.
When making pancakes, the subaction of adding egg to the mix-
ture consists of picking up an egg, breaking it (above the bowl), and
discarding the empty shell (not above the bowl). It should be clear
that the breaking of the egg is the most important action in this
sequence. Dissociating important actions from non-important
actions can account for skipping unnecessary steps. When apply-
ing butter to two slices of toast, it is not necessary to execute the
supporting actions“discard knife”and“pick up knife”between the
two executions of the “butter toast” action program. Second, the
implementation of goals would allow for subactions that serve the
same purpose to be interchanged. For example, ﬂipping a pancake
by ﬂipping it in the air or ﬂipping it using a spatula would both
be perfectly good methods for pancake ﬂipping, and the shared
goal allows these actions to be interchanged. Models without goal
representation can only show this behavior if they are explicitly
trained on all the alternative actions that can be taken. To make the
realization that a set of actions are equivalent for achieving a goal,
a model would in essence have to contain a representation of that
goal.
Interestingly, however, goal representations (whether explicit
or implicit) can play an important role in contextualizing cogni-
tive representations. Most representational accounts assume that
representations of stimulus and action events are invariant. The
need to contextualize representations – i.e., to tailor them to the
particular situation and task at hand – thus seems to put the entire
burden on the goal, so that the explicit representation of the goal
seems to be a necessary precondition for adaptive behavior. But,
from a grounded cognition perspective, it seems that alternative
scenarios are possible. In a grounded cognition framework, the
representation of objects and object categories takes an embod-
ied form, using modal features from at least the visual, motor,
and auditory modalities (Prinz and Barsalou, 2000). For exam-
ple, the concept of apple would be represented by a network of
visual codes representing <green> and <round>, but also the
auditory <crunchy sound> of biting into it. The embodied cog-
nition framework has already been successfully implemented in
robot platforms such as iCub, and shows stimulus compatibility
effects similar to those that can be observed in humans (Macura
et al., 2009; Pezzulo et al., 2011).
According to the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al.,
2001), events are represented – like objects – in a feature-based,
distributed fashion. This will mean that the aforementioned apple
would be represented by a network of codes representing not
only the apple’s perceptual features such as being <greenish>
and <round>, but also its properties such as being <edible>,
<graspable>, <carryable>, <throwable>, and so forth. In this
view, one of the main roles of goals is to emphasize (i.e., increase
the weight of) those features that in the present task are of particu-
lar importance. This means that when hungry, the feature of being
<edible> will be primed in advance and become more activated
when facing an apple, while <throwability> will become more
important when being in danger and trying to defend oneself.
Several studies have provided evidence that goals are indeed bias-
ing attentional settings toward action-relevant feature dimensions
(e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007; Wykowska et al., 2009; Kühn et al., 2011),
suggesting that the impact of goals goes beyond the selection
of production rules and outcome evaluation. Interestingly, this
kind of “intentional weighting” function (Memelink and Hom-
mel, 2013) can be considered to represent the current goal without
requiring any explicit representation – verymuch along the lines of
Botvinick and Plaut (2004).
Another potential role of goals is related to temporal order. In
chaining models, the dimension of time was unnecessary because
the completionof each component automatically“ignites”the next
component. The same holds for current planners in cognitive
robotics, which commonly ﬁx the order of action subcompo-
nents (e.g., CRAM: Beetz et al., 2010). But action plans may
follow a more abstract syntax instead, much like how syntac-
tic constraints of natural languages allow for various possible
sequences. For instance, consider the process of making tea. With
the possible exception of true connoisseurs, it doesn’t make any
difference for most tea drinkers whether one puts the tea or
the water into the cup ﬁrst; i.e., the order of these two sub-
actions is interchangeable. A truly ﬂexible system would thus
allow for any of these orders, depending on whether water or
tea is immediately at hand. While a chaining model would not
allow for changing the original order, a more syntactic action
plan would merely deﬁne possible slots for particular subcom-
ponents (e.g., Rosenbaum et al., 1986), so that the actual order of
execution would be an emerging property of the interaction of
the syntactic plan and the situational availability of the necessary
ingredients.
These considerations suggest that robotic systems need to
incorporate at least some rudimentary aspects of time and tempo-
ral order to get on par with humans. Along these lines,Maniadakis
and Trahanias (2011) have propagated the idea that robotic sys-
tems should be equippedwith somekindof temporal cognition, be
it by incorporating temporal logic or event calculus. Indeed, recent
robotic knowledge representation systems, such as KnowRob
(Tenorth and Beetz, 2012), do possess the ability to do spatiotem-
poral reasoning about the changing locations of objects, such as
predicting when and where objects can be found.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed how conceptions of robotic action planning
can beneﬁt from insights into human action planning. Indeed,
we believe that constructing truly ﬂexible and autonomous robots
requires inspiration from human cognition. We focused on four
basic principles that characterize human action planning, and we
have argued that taking these principles on boardwill help tomake
artiﬁcial cognition more human-like.
First, we have discussed evidence that human action planning
emerges from the integration of a rather abstract, perhaps sym-
bolic representational level and concurrent planning at a lower,
more concrete representational level. It is certainly true that multi-
level planning can create difﬁcult coordination problems. Using
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grounded cognition approaches in robotics is potentially a good
method to ground such higher-level symbolic representation in
lower-level sensorimotor representations, which may allow robot
action to become more ﬂexible and efﬁcient.
Second, we have argued that human action planning emerges
from the interplay of feedforward and feedback mechanisms.
Again, purely feedforward or purely feedback architectures are
likely to be more transparent and easier to control. However, fast,
real-time robotic action in uncertain environments will require
a hybrid approach that distributes labor much like the human
brain does by combining slow and highly optimized feedforward
control with fast sensorimotor loops that continuously update the
available environmental information. A major challenge for the
near future will be to combine such hybrid systems with error-
monitoring and error-correcting mechanisms. When preparing
pancake dough, accidentally pouring some milk outside the bowl
would need to trigger a fast correction mechanism informed by
low-level sensory feedback but not necessarily the re-planning of
(or crying over) the entire action. However, if for some reason
the entire milk carton is emptied by this accident, leaving the
agent without the necessary ingredient, feedback would have to
propagate to higher, more abstract or more comprehensive plan-
ning levels to decide whether the plan needs to be aborted. How
this works in detail and how decisions are made as to which level
is to be informed is not well understood, but progress is being
made. Research into feedback processes has yielded information
about the optimal speed of sensorimotor loops (Joshi and Maass,
2005), and we ﬁnd it reasonable to expect that models using such
fast feedback loops combined with accurate feedforward plan-
ning can ultimately produce human-like motor performance in
robots.
Third, we have argued that while descriptions of human actions
may refer to a hierarchy, it is not yet clear whether the cognitive –
in vivo or in silico – representations of such actions need to be
explicitly hierarchical as well. Equally unclear is whether represen-
tations that differ in hierarchical level would necessarily need to
differ in format. However, it is clear that representations that are
considered to be “higher in hierarchy” are more comprehensive.
The concept of “making a pancake,” say, is necessarily richer and
more abstract than the associated lower-level actions of “reach-
ing for egg” and “grabbing a pan,” suggesting that the latter two
are more directly grounded in sensorimotor activity (Kraft et al.,
2008). Future research will need to investigate how representa-
tions at different planning levels (or different levels of description)
interact or relate to each other.
The nature of goals and their role in action control is also amat-
ter of ongoing research. The two different viewpoints – i.e., that
goals require explicit representation or not – seem to reﬂect dif-
ferent preferences in conceptualization and modeling techniques,
and it may well turn out that an explicit representation of goals
in the preferred modeling language translates to a more implicit
representation of goals in the actual functional or neural archi-
tecture. In robotics, most modern plan languages use a form of
explicit goal-related action control that deﬁnes a goal as a required
world state on which constraints can be imposed. Such a struc-
ture is ﬂexible enough to allow equiﬁnality, but it is unclear how
knowledge about the variousmeans to produce a result is acquired.
Ultimately, we believe that subsymbolic programming approaches
may allow for more adaptive, “human” representational architec-
tures – though likelymore difﬁcult to engineer and deﬁne provably
safe operating conditions for.
To conclude, we believe that the construction of robots that
are up to real-life, everyday actions in environments that are as
uncertain as human environments requires the consideration of
cognitive principles like the four principles we have discussed in
this article. The beneﬁt of doing so will be twofold. For one, it will
strongly increase the ﬂexibility of robots. For another, it will make
robots more human-like in the eyes of the human user, which
will help us understand and cooperate with our future robotic
colleagues.
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